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I.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review
Industrial Commission Board of Review decisions by virtue of The
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Section 63-466-16.

II.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Was the Board of Review decision based on substantial

evidence sufficient to support its conclusions?
B.

Was the Board of Review's application of facts to law

within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality?
C.

Did the board of review act arbitrarily in issuing a

decision contrary to applicable law?
D.

Did the Board of Review violate equal protection by

drawing an unreasonable classification with no rational relation
to the Employment Security Act, or by giving disparate treatment
to a member of a class on irrational bases with no relation to
the Employment Security Act?
E.

Did the Board of Review violate due process by applying

the Unemployment Security Act in a manner arbitrary, unreasonable
and with no rational relation to that Act?

III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
A.

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment,

Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they
1

reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shalT any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
B.

Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

C.

Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 24.
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.

D.

Utah Employment Security Act, Utah Code Ann. Sections

35-4-2, 35-4-5(b)(1).
35-4-2: Public Policy - General Welfare requires
creation of unemployment reserves - employment offices.
- As a guide to the interpretation and application of
this act, the public policy of this state is declared
to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to
unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals,
and welfare of the people of this state. Unemployment
is therefore a subject of general interest and concern
which requires appropriate action by the legislature to
prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now
so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed
worker and his family. The achievement of social
security requires protection against this greatest
hazard of our economic life. This objective can be
furthered by operating free public employment offices
in affiliation with a nation-wide system of employment
services, by devising appropriate methods for reducing
the volume of unemployment and by the systematic
accumulation of funds during periods of employment from
which benefits may be paid for periods of unemployment,
thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the
serious social consequences of unemployment. The
legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered
judgment the public good, and the general welfare of
the citizens of this state require the enactment of
this measure, under the police power of the state, for
the establishment and maintenance of free public
employment offices and for the compulsory setting aside
of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of
unemployed persons.
2

35-4-5.

Ineligibility for benefits.

An individual is ineligible for benefits or for
purposes of establishing a waiting%period:
*

*

*

(b)(1): For the week in which the claimant was
discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in
connection with employment, not constituting a crime,
which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to
the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the
commission, and thereafter until the claimant has
earned an amount equal to at least six times the
claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered
employment.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE.

Claimant, Kevin R. Johnson, was discharged as an employee of
Respondent Morton Thiokol.

He applied for and was allowed

unemployment compensation by the Utah Department of Employment
Security.

Morton Thiokol appealed the Department of Employment

Security's decision to the Department of Employment Security
Appeals Tribunal.

Administrative Law Judge Norman Barnes heard

the appeal, and upheld the decision of the Department of
Employment Security, allowing benefits to Claimant Johnson.
Morton Thiokol appealed the Administrative Law Judge's decision
to the Industrial Commission Board of Review.
The Board of Review issued a first decision, No. 88-BR-086,
on May 10, 1988. Claimant and Claimant's counsel were not given
proper notice of that appeal, however, so the Board granted
Claimant's motion to reconsider.

The Board accepted written

argument from Claimant and Morton Thiokol, and sua sponte
3

remanded the case to the Administrative Law Judge for the taking
of additional evidence.

The hearing on remand was held October

26, 1988. The Board of Review then issued its final decision on
December 30th, 1988. The final Board of Review decision upheld
its May 10, 1988 decision reversing the Administrative Law Judge,
denying Claimant unemployment compensation, and requiring an
overpayment to be deducted from any future benefits payable to
him during that benefit year.

Claimant seeks review of the Board

of Review decision.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Claimant Kevin R. Johnson was an employee of Morton Thiokol,
Inc. Administrative Law Judge Hearing February 11, 1988
(Hearing), pg. 4.

Johnson was involved in an auto accident while

driving a company truck on company time.

Hearing, pg 5, 10.

Johnson was absolved of any fault in the accident, but was drug
tested pursuant to a Morton Thiokol policy that mandates drug
testing after any job related auto accident after which the
employee needs medical attention.
Johnson's drug test after the auto accident, taken on
September 21, 1987, showed positive for marijuana at 128
nanograms per milliliter.

Administrative Law Judge Hearing on

Remand, October 26, 1988 (Remand), pg. 23.

Based on that

positive test, Johnson was given a three day disciplinary
suspension, counseling, and 12 months of probation in which he
might be subjected to random drug testing.

Hearing, pp. 5, 8.

Johnson was drug tested again 65 days later, on November 25,
4

1987, and showed 25 nanograms per milliliter of marijuana
metabolites.

Remand, pg. 24.

a positive test.

Id.

20 nanograms is the threshold for

Based on the second positive test which

showed 25 nanograms, Johnson was discharged from his employment
with Morton Thiokol.

Hearing, pg. 5.

Johnson's personnel file showed him to be a satisfactory
employee.

Hearing, pg. 9.

Morton Thiokol made no claim that

Johnson used marijuana on the job or reported to work under its
influence.

Hearing, pp. 9-10.

Johnson testified he never used

marijuana on company premises or company time, and never reported
to work under its influence.

Hearing, pg. 11. He further

testified he used no marijuana at all after the auto accident and
the first drug test.

Hearing, pg. 12. He testified that any

exposure to marijuana he encountered would be from passive
inhalation of his roommates' smoke.

Hearing, pg. 13. Morton

Thiokol's personnel representative, however, testified Morton
Thiokol's test procedure was set-up through consultants so that
passive inhalation would not result in a positive test.

Hearing,

pg. 13.
Morton Thiokol made no claim that the auto accident was the
result of marijuana use by Johnson.

Hearing, pg. 6.

To the

contrary, Johnson's supervisor reported that Johnson did not
appear to be under the influence of marijuana at the time of the
accident.

Hearing, pg. 6.

Morton Thiokol made no claim that

Johnson acted against its interest in any way.

Hearing, pg. 8.

The sole reason Johnson was discharged from employment was the
5

second positive test.

Hearing, pg. 5.

V.
A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

THE BOARD OF REVIEW DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS NOT REASONABLE OR RATIONAL

The Board of Review's findings are not supported by
substantial evidence and must be overturned.

The Board of Review

based its findings on the testimony of Morton Thiokol's in-house
physician• In so doing, the Board of Review disregarded the
Claimant's testimony which the Administrative Law Judge (ALT)
found to be credible, disregarded the bias of Morton Thiokol's
physician and the conflicts in his own testimony, and disregarded
the testimony of a more credible and qualified expert.
Also, the Board of Review decision was not within the bounds
of reasonableness and rationality.

First, the mere numbers of

the test results compel the conclusion that Johnson had ceased
marijuana use.

Second, the Board of Review's decision that even

passive inhalation is sufficient grounds for denial is plainly
irrational.

Finally, off the job marijuana use should be no

concern of Morton Thiokol's or at least no concern of the
Department of Unemployment Security in granting unemployment
compensation.
B.
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ACTED ARBITRARILY IN ISSUING A
DECISION CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have
established an analysis for Boards of Review to follow in
determining an applicant's qualification for unemployment
compensation.

The Board of Review arbitrarily ignored these
6

precedents and the analysis they require in denying Johnson
benefits.

Those precedents require the Board of Review to find

the Claimant's culpability, knowledge and control sufficient for
a rightful denial of unemployment compensation.

Application of

Johnson's case to the analysis established by this Court and the
Utah Supreme Court compels reversal of the Board of Review
decision.
The Board of Review ruled that any positive test for
marijuana is grounds for denial of unemployment benefits,
regardless of the claimant's culpability, knowledge and control.
This ignores logic, rationality, fairness and the Board of
Review's obligation to act in accord with standards set by
established precedent.

This arbitrary Board of Review action

should be reversed.
C.

THE BOARD OF REVIEW VIOLATED STATE AND FEDERAL
GUARANTEES OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

The Board of Review's decision violates state and federal
equal protection.

These Constitutional guarantees may be

violated both in enacting statutes &nd rules, and in their
execution by government officials.

Administrative bodies are

subject to the limitations of equal protection.
of Review's flawed application of an otherwise

Here, the Board
constitutionally

valid statute violated equal protection.
First, classifications and the different treatment given the
classes must be rationally related to the purpose of the statute.
The Board of Review's decision has the effect of creating a
separate class of all employees fired for positive drug tests
7

whose drug use does not relate to work performance.

All other

claimants will be reviewed under the culpability, knowledge and
control standard established by this Court,

Those, such as

Johnson, with positive drug tests will be denied compensation
merely on the result of the test, despite the many circumstances
which may give rise to a positive test, and despite the fact that
any drug use may have had no negative impact on the employer.
This simply has no rational and just relationship to the purpose
of the employment compensation statutes and rules.

Therefore,

the only class which may be fashioned with a rational
relationship to the purposes of the Employment Security Act is
the class comprised of all employees, otherwise qualified, who
are challenged as having been terminated for just cause.
Having defined the class, the law must be applied equally to
all class members.

All other members of the class are judged on

a standard which requires some conduct of the claimant which
injured the employer in its business, i.e., some job related
conduct.

To deny benefits to Johnson for conduct not related to

the job is an irrational distinction not related to the purpose
of the statute, and violates equal protection.
D,

THE BOARD OF REVIEW DECISION VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS

Substantive due process protects individuals from arbitrary
action of state administrative agencies.

The Board of Review

decision holds that mere association with marijuana users is
sufficient grounds for denial of unemployment compensation.
is arbitrary and unreasonable and a denial of due process.
8

That

Second, to deny benefits to Johnson for conduct not related to
his job performance or the interest of the employer is arbitrary,
irrational and unrelated to the purpose of the Employment
Security Act.

Finally, the Board of Review's failure to properly

apply applicable law is arbitrary, unreasonable, and a violation
of due process.

VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE BOARD OF REVIEW DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS NOT REASONABLE OR RATIONAL

The Board of Review decision to reverse the award of
benefits by the ALJ should be overturned by this Court and
remanded to the Board of Review to reinstate the prior award of
employment compensation.

Decisions of the Utah Industrial

Commission Boards of Review are reviewed by an intermediate
standard, under which the Court must determine if the Board of
Review decision was "within the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality."
Security,

Champlin Petroleum v. Department of Employment

744 P.2d 330, 331 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);

Sevier County

Board of Ed. v. Board of Review. 701 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1985).
The Court's review of the facts is "limited to a determination of
whether the Commission's findings are supported by substantial
evidence."
(Utah 1986).

Logan Hospital v. Board of Review, 723 P.2d 427, 429
Here, The Board of Review's decision is based on

evidence which no reasonable person could find to be credible, in
direct conflict with contrary findings of the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ).

The application of law to those facts is logically
9

strained and apparently oriented to a preconceived result. The
decision, therefore, must be overturned as unreasonable and
irrational.
The Board of Review's findings are not supported by
substantial evidence and must be overturned.

The Board of Review

based its findings on the testimony of Morton Thiokol's in-house
physician. In so doing, the Board of Review disregarded the
Claimant's testimony which the ALJ found to be credible,
disregarded the bias of Morton Thiokol's physician and the
conflicts in his own testimony, and disregarded the testimony of
a more credible and qualified expert.
In administrative proceedings of the Department of
Employment Security, the hearing at which witnesses are sworn and
testimony is taken is conducted before an ALJ.
serves the trial court function.

That hearing

The ALJ is the trier of fact,

and should be accorded the deference given to trial courts as
triers of fact in other proceedings.

See Young v. Board of

Review, 731 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1986) (findings of administrative
law judge will not be substituted where* supported by ample
evidence);

Logan Regional Hosp. v. Board of Review, 723 P.2d at

428 (it is for administrative agency to choose between
conflicting facts);

Lane v. Board of Review, 727 P.2d 206 (Utah

1986) (giving findings of administrative law judge deference over
findings of board of review).
Here, the ALT witnessed Johnson's testimony that he had not
used marijuana since before September 1987, the date of the first
10

positive test.

The ALJ found that testimony to be credible,

finding that claimant "denied any consumption of marijuana since
September and attributes the positive test to passive
inhalation."

Administrative Law Judge Decision (ALJ Dec.) pg. 2.

The ALJ further found Johnson "emphatically denies using
marijuana after September, 1987."

ALJ Dec. pg. 3.

Morton

Thiokol did not refute that testimony, but rather admitted they
"are not stating when Mr. Johnson took the substance.
tests show is there was a substance in his system."
Testimony of Jim Fox, pg. 9.

All our
Hearing,

The ALJ thus concluded "the

claimant was not discharged from his employment for just cause or
for an act or omission in connection with employment that was
deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse to the employer's
rightful interests."

ALJ Dec. pg. 3.

The Board of Review disregarded the ALJ's findings and found
Johnson's testimony that he ceased marijuana use after the first
test to not be credible.
pg. 2.

Board of Review Decision No. 88-BR-428,

The Board of Review did so on the basis of a cold record,

without deference to the ALJ's ability as trier of fact to weigh
Johnson's credibility face to face.

Rather, it based its

decision on the strained logic that if Johnson lived with
marijuana users, he must use marijuana himself, and that the
remaining minimal presence of marijuana in Johnson's system was
sufficient evidence of continued use.

That reasoning does not

give just deference to the ALJ's findings and is not based on
evidence of any substance.

The Board of Review's findings should
11

thus be overturned.
The Board of Review also based its decision on the testimony
of Morton Thiokol's in-house physician.

Before issuing its final

decision the Board of Review remanded the matter to the ALJ for
more fact taking.

Board of Review Decision No. 88-BR-086,

September 27, 1988. The Board of Review requested the Board to
subpoena Dr. Ellwood Loveridge, Director of Scientific Support
Services of the Salt Lake County Health Department, to provide
information regarding drug testing and drug metabolism, and
requested Morton Thiokol to provide better evidence of its
testing procedures and Johnson's tests specifically.
Loveridge was properly subpoenaed and attended.
Law Judge Remand Hearing (Remand), pg. 2.

Id.

Dr.

Administrative

However, Morton

Thiokol did not properly prepare its hearing representative, so
its hearing representative came to the hearing with no additional
evidence.

Remand, pg. 4.

At the ALJ's request, Morton Thiokol's

in-house physician was contacted by conference telephone to
provide some of the information Morton Thiokol was to have
prepared for the remand hearing.

Remand, pg. 5.

Morton Thiokol's in-house physician, Dr. Kerr, was
originally called to testify as to Morton Thiokol's testing
procedure, and as to Johnson's test results, so Dr. Loveridge
would have accurate information on which to opine.
6-7 & 20-24.

Remand, pp.

However, as the examination progressed, Dr. Kerr

was put in the position of being both a fact witness and an
expert witness as to his own facts. Remand, pp. 24-28.
12

Dr. Kerr

is Morton Thiokol's Medical Director, in charge of supervising
the drug tests and the drug screening program•
Law Judge Hearing (Hearing), pg. 6;

Administrative

Remand, pp. 21-22.

He

therefore testified as to the propriety and fairness of his own
testing program.

His bias was clear in his conflicting

testimony, and brings into question the credibility of his
opinions.
Dr. Kerr first testified that the results of Johnson's first
test in September showed a presence of marijuana metabolites of
128 nanograms per milliliters.

Remand, pg. 23. Johnson was

tested 65 days later and showed the presence of 25 nanograms per
milliliter.

Id.

20 nanograms per milliliter is considered a

positive test result.

Id.

Dr. Kerr went on to testify that he is familiar with human
toxicology, but he is not a specialist in that field.

Remand,

pg. 24. He testified, however, he has knowledge of the length of
time marijuana residue remains in the body.

Remand, pg 25. He

testified "[i]t is one of the longer lasting substances that can
be detected."

Id.

And, after chronic use, it "can be detected

by the tests we [Morton Thiokol] are using for several weeks
after its usage is discontinued."

Id.

Dr. Kerr then responded

to an inquiry about an experiment which showed positive results
for up to 81 days after marijuana ingestion.

He testified 81

days "would fit into the range of several weeks that I have in
mind, yes." Id.
Dr. Kerr testified that Johnson's reduction from 128 to 2 5
13

nanograms per milliliter would be considered a significant
reduction.

Id.

As to what happened between the two tests to

cause the reduction, Dr. Kerr testified:
Well as I said it is a significant lower result, which
could mean decreased or discontinued use of the
substance. We can't predict how long before that 25
nanogram level was found the last exposure to marijuana
occurred. I don't know of any way to predict that
other than we do know there is a prolonged time in
which it remains positive.
Remand, pg. 26 (emphasis added).

Then in response to the

specific question of whether the claimant not have used marijuana
between the first and second tests, Dr. Kerr reversed his prior
responses, answering:
No, because we are talking there about, I believe, 2
1/2 months. I know of nothing to indicate that
prolonged positive result after discontinued use.
Remand, pg. 26. He testified that "4 to 6 weeks is as long as I
am aware of any studies confirming [marijuana metabolites in
urine]."

Asked if he recalled studies longer than 24 days, he

testified:

"Not that I am personally acquainted with."

Remand,

pp. 27-28.
In its final decision the Board of Review disregarded Dr.
Kerr's testimony that a person could test positive for marijuana
use after 81 days of abstinence.

It similarly disregarded Dr.

Kerr's testimony that the dramatic decrease in the level of
Johnson's test results could mean discontinued use of marijuana,
and his testimony that they "can't predict how long before that
25 nanogram level was found the last exposure to marijuana
occurred."

Remand, pg. 26; See 88-BR-428, pg. 2.
14

In short, the

Board of Review chose selectively among Dr. Kerr's biased,
conflicting testimony to find evidence to support its position.
To the contrary, the weight of Dr. Kerr's testimony compels the
conclusion that a 25 nanogram test result found 65 days after a
128 nanogram result is simply the product of residue from
previous marijuana use, or residue combined with passive
inhalation.

The Board of Review decision therefore is not

supported by substantial evidence.
In addition, the Board of Review similarly disregarded
competent evidence from an unbiased expert.

At the Board of

Review's request, the ALJ called Dr. Ellwood L. Loveridge to
offer expert testimony on the drug test results.

Dr. Loveridge

testified he did not study drug screening in school, but had
since studied drug testing at seminars and through private
reading.

Remand, pg. 15.

He testified his office had done a

number of marijuana tests.

Dr. Loveridge testified "there is a

lot of controversy on how long marijuana stays in the body.
Remand, pg. 16.

He testified that the Health Department had

conducted anonymous studies in which credibility is likely to be
very high.

Remand, pg. 28.

He testified:

But we have had people who have tested as high as Mr.
Johnson did in the 120's who have been positive for
three months afterwards and are anxious to get it down
because they have been going to take a test with an
employer. And so they have asked if I knew of any way
to speed up its elimination and I don't know of any
way. It is fat soluble and it does take a long time to
get metabolized and excreted. But we have had them for
over three months still testing above our threshold
which is 25. And it doesn't come down in a straight
line. They will test one time at 120 and the next time
at 100 and the next, three or four days later it will
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test back up at 115.
Remandf pg. 28. As to passive inhalation, Dr. Loveridge
testified:
Now again, I have to preface it with a, we don't have
the money nor the interest to do the publishable type
study that would be nice to have. We are not going to
do it. But passive inhalation, I think has been done
mostly with people who haven't had marijuana and then
they put them in a room with others who are smoking, or
in a closed car, and measure their levels. But a
person who has smoked has a base line that is higher
than a non-smoker. And it doesn't take many nanograms
for a person who has a base line of 18 to test positive
with the EMIT system. And so I think passive
inhalation has been given the wrong credit because we
have tested it with non-users and when we try and
extract those results to users, they are not
legitimate. So I think passive inhalation is a factor,
or can be a factor in a person who has a residual,
marijuana layer, in their body so to speak.
Remand, pg. 30.
Thus, Dr. Loveridge's independent, unbiased testimony
clearly supports Johnson's assertion that Johnson's 25 nanogram
test was the result of residue from his use of marijuana prior to
his first Morton Thiokol drug test, or the result of residue plus
passive inhalation.

The Board of Review, however, did not

consider Loveridge's testimony.
Claimant's counsel had initially raised an objection to Dr.
Loveridge's qualification as an expert.

The Board of Review

granted that motion and disregarded Dr. Loveridge's testimony.
Johnson's counsel however, made his objection before Dr.
Loveridge had testified.

Once Dr. Loveridge testified, it became

clear he was a qualified expert and gave competent testimony.
expert witness is one who is "qualified as an expert by
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An

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education . . ." Utah
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702.

Dr. Loveridge's salient, insightful

answers at the Hearing clearly show he meets this minimal
standard.

Certainly compared to Dr. Kerr, whose expert testimony

was allowed, Dr. Loveridge was a qualified expert.

Once accepted

as an expert, the credibility of his testimony may of course be
weighed just as is done with any other witness.

The Board of

Review erred in not considering his testimony, and instead
fashioning a ruling on flawed testimony without the substance to
support its decision.
The sum of the testimony before the Board of Review was
therefore as follows. Marijuana clearly is detectable in the
urine for long periods of time. Morton Thiokol's test does not
show how long before the test was administered the subject used
marijuana.

A past chronic user of marijuana may have a base line

amount of marijuana in his system that is fairly high, so he is
much more likely than one who has never used marijuana to show
positive after being subjected to passive inhalation.

Finally,

Johnson testified emphatically that he had not used marijuana
since his first Morton Thiokol drug test.

The ALT who witnessed

Johnson's testimony found Johnson to be credible.

The weight of

evidence, therefore, weighs in favor of Johnson's assertions.
The evidence on which the Board of Review relied lacks the
substance to support its decision.

Therefore, if Johnson had not

smoked marijuana after the first test as the evidence supports,
he was not fired for just cause and should be allowed
17

unemployment compensation.
Not only was the Board of Review decision not based on
substantial evidence, it also was not "reasonable or rational."
Sevier County Board of Education v. Board of Review, 701 P.2d
1064, 1067 (Utah 1985).

First, the mere numbers of the test

results compel the conclusion that Johnson had ceased marijuana
use.

Second, the Board of Review's decision that even passive

inhalation is sufficient grounds for denial is plainly
irrational.

Finally, off the job marijuana use should be no

concern of Morton Thiokol's or at least no concern of the
Department of Unemployment Security in granting unemployment
compensation.
Johnson first tested positive at 128 nanograms.
later he tested at 25 nanograms.
days.

65 days

This is a 500% reduction in 65

A positive result is 20 nanograms, so Johnson was just

barely positive.

Given the uncertainty about the length of time

marijuana remains in the body, logic dictates that Johnson's 2 5
nanogram test was the result of residue from marijuana use prior
to his first test.

Additionally, Johnson testified he was

subject to passive inhalation of his roommates' smoke.

The

marijuana from this passive inhalation would combine with
Johnson's base line residue to produce an even higher result.
Logic and reason compel the conclusion that Johnson's barely
positive test result was not the product of continued marijuana
use but the product of factors completely beyond his control.
Second, the Board of Review held that even passive
18

inhalation of other's marijuana smoke is no less "culpable or
harmful in its effect than direct inhalation of marijuana smoke*"
Board of Review Decision No. 88-BR-428, pg. 4.

Thus, mere

association with marijuana users would be sufficient grounds for
denial of unemployment compensation.

It is patently absurd that

an employee may be discharged and denied unemployment
compensation based on violation of an employer's drug policy
without having used the drug.

The Board of Review's holding that

passive inhalation is sufficient grounds for denial of
unemployment compensation is plainly unreasonable.
Finally, as the ALJ held, "[t]he claimant's activities while
off the job, however, should be of no concern to the employer
unless it is shown his job performance is negatively impacted."
ALJ D e c , pg 3.

Johnson was initially tested because of an

automobile accident that was determined to not be his fault.
Hearing, pg. 5.

Morton Thiokol made no claim that Johnson used

marijuana on the job or reported to work under its influence.
Hearing, pp. 9-10.

Morton Thiokol's representative testified

that Johnson was a satisfactory employee.

Hearing, pg. 9.

He

was discharged solely on the basis of his positive drug test.
Hearing, pg. 5.

The Board of Review thus denied unemployment

compensation to a satisfactory employee, discharged for conduct
with no relation whatsoever to his job or job performance.

That

is plainly irrational and unreasonable.
The Board of Review's decision is not supported by
substantial evidence, and ignored credible, compelling evidence
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to the contrary.

The Board of Review decision denied simple

logic, and is plainly irrational and unreasonable.

This Court

should therefore reverse the Board of Review and allow benefits
as determined by the Administrative Law Judge,

B.

THE BOARD OF REVIEW ACTED ARBITRARILY IN ISSUING A
DECISION CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW

The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have
established an analysis for Boards of Review to follow in
determining an applicant's qualification for unemployment
compensation.

Logan Regional Hospital v. Board of Review, 723

P.2d 427 (Utah 1986);

Champlin v. Board of Review, 744 P.2d 330

(Utah Ct, App. 1987)•

The Board of Review arbitrarily ignored

these precedents and the analysis they require in denying Johnson
benefits•

Application of Johnson's case to the analysis

established by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court compels
reversal of the Board of Review decision•
It is well settled that not every ground for termination of
employment is a ground for denial of unemployment compensation.
Champlin, 744 P.2d at 331;

Logan Hospital, 723 P.2d at 429;

Sevier County Board of Education v. Board of Review,
1064, 1068 (Utah 1985).

701 P.2d

Private employers such as Morton Thiokol

have almost plenary discretion to hire and fire, except as
controlled by collective bargaining agreements, employment
contracts and state and federal anti-discrimination laws.

The

State of Utah, however, in considering claims for unemployment
compensation through the Department of Employment Security, may
20

not act arbitrarily, but must act rationally and reasonably.
This means the Department of Employment Security and its Boards
of Review must act in accord with the statutes and rules that
control them, and in accord with cases interpreting those
statutes and rules.

Unemployment compensation may only be denied

an otherwise qualified claimant on a showing that the employee
was at fault as defined by Utah Code Ann. Section 35-4-5(b)(1)
and cases that interpret that section.
Unemployment compensation may only be denied an otherwise
qualified applicant if:
the claimant was discharged for just cause, or for an
act or omission in connection with employment, not
constituting a crime, which was deliberate, wilful or
wanton, and adverse to the employees rightful interest,
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1) (emphasis added);
723 P.2d at 429-30;

Logan Hospital,

Champlin, 744 P.2d at 330-32.

That statute

has been interpreted to require fault of the employee, based on a
three part showing of the employee's culpability, knowledge and
control.

Champlin, 744 P.2d at 331.

Culpability for purposes of that standard is explained in
the Unemployment Insurance Rules of the Utah Department of
Employment Security as follows:
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity
of the offense as it affects continuance of the
employment relationship. The discharge must have been
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the
employers rightful interests. A discharge would not
be considered "necessary" if it is not consistent with
reasonable employment practices. The wrongness of the
conduct must be considered in the context of the
particular employment and how it affects the employer's
rights. If the conduct was an isolated incident of
poor judgment and there is no expectation that the
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conduct will be continued or repeated potential harm
may not be shown and therefore it is not
necessary
to discharge the employee.
Unemployment Insurance Rule 35-4-5(b)(l) para. Bl (1986) cited in
Champ1in, 744 P.2d at 332 (emphasis added).
To justify a denial of benefits, therefore, the conduct
giving rise to the termination must have been committed on the
job or have impacted job performance.

Champ1in, 744 P.2d at 331.

In Champlin, the claimant had worked alone at a job with a great
deal of responsibility.

Champlin Petroleum v. Dept. of

Employment Security, 744 P.2d 330, 330-31 (Utah Ct. App.1987).
After years of successful job performance the claimant suffered a
mental breakdown caused by a mental illness, the symptoms of
which were exacerbated by claimant's marijuana use.

On the

claimant's return to work his doctor recommended that he be
supervised on the job for a time.
to work alone he was discharged.

Because his job required him
The claimant was granted

unemployment compensation and the employer appealed.
The Champlin claimant testified that he smoked marijuana
twice a week for some time while he worked for the Champlin
employer.

There was no evidence that he used marijuana on the

job or reported to work under its influence.

The claimant's

supervisor testified that the claimant had been a satisfactory
employee.

The Champlin Court found that "any exacerbation of his

mental problems from his use of marijuana did not rise to the
level of fault essential to establish just cause and deny him
unemployment benefits." Champlin, 744 P.2d at 333.
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In the present action there was no evidence that Johnson
smoked marijuana on the job, was impaired by the drug on the job,
or acted in any other way contrary to Morton Thiokol's rightful
interests.

Hearing, pp. 8-11.

In fact, Morton Thiokol made no

claim that Johnson acted against Morton Thiokol's interest in any
way.

Id. at pp. 8-9.

In Champlin, the claimant's off the job

marijuana use exacerbated a mental illness which was the cause of
the claimant's inability to work and the reason he was ultimately
fired.

Here, Johnson's marijuana use had absolutely no impact on

his job performance or his ability to continue as a satisfactory
employee of Morton Thiokol. Johnson, even more than the Champlin
claimant, thus lacked the culpability necessary for a denial of
unemployment compensation.
The uncontroverted testimony before the Board of Review was
that Johnson used no marijuana after the first positive test.
Nonetheless, from a cold record without the benefit of witnessing
Johnson's examination, the Board of Review found that testimony
to not be credible and assumed Johnson had continued to use
marijuana.

Board of Review Decision No. 88-BR-428, pp. 3-4.

However, even if Johnson had used marijuana off the job, in a way
which did not impair his job performance, Champlin compels the
conclusion that Johnson would lack the culpability necessary for
a denial of unemployment compensation.
The Board of Review did not find that Johnson's marijuana
use impaired his job performance, or that Johnson used marijuana
on the job or reported for work under influence of the drug.
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Rather, the Board of Review found that any presence of marijuana
sufficient to test positive under Morton Thiokol's standard for
any reason was sufficiently adverse to Morton Thiokol's interest
to warrant termination for just cause and denial of benefits•
88-BR-428, pg. 4.

The Board went so far as to hold that even if

the presence of the drug was a result of passive inhalation from
others, it would be sufficient to deny Johnson his unemployment
benefits•

Id,

As discussed above this ignores logic and reason,

but it also ignores the clear precedent established by this Court
and the Utah Supreme Court.

The logic of Champ1in is intact, and

its application is fair and reasonable.

The Board of Review's

arbitrary departure from Champlin's reasoning is itself
sufficient grounds for reversal.
The second necessary element of a claimant's fault is
knowledge that the conduct will likely result in termination.
Champ1in, 744 P.2d at 331;

Grinnell v. Board of Review,

P.2d 113, 114 (Utah 1987);

Green v. Board of Review,

966 (Utah 1986).

732

728 P.2d

Such knowledge "may not be established unless

the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior."
Green. 728 P.2d at 998.

Here, Johnson understood that a second

positive test would likely result in termination, but he was not
given an explanation of what a positive test level actually was,
or the conduct that would likely result in a positive test.
discussed at length elsewhere in this brief, Johnson's
uncontroverted testimony was that he did not smoke marijuana
after the first test but was subject to passive inhalation.
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As

Hearing, pp. 12-13.

It is highly unlikely that Johnson

understood passive inhalation could result in a positive test and
subject him to termination.

Another likely explanation for the

second test result was the lingering presence of marijuana in his
system.

Dr. Loveridge testified that test subjects with

marijuana levels similar to Johnsons tested positive up to 120
days after discontinued use.

Remand, pg. 28. Another

independent tests show positive tests for marijuana 81 days after
ingestion.

National Law Journal, Drug Testing:

The Scene is Set

for a Dramatic Legal Collision. Vol. 8, No. 29, Mon. 4/7/86.
Because Johnson used no marijuana after the first test, he
committed no conduct which he knew would likely result in
termination.

Johnson therefore lacks the required element of

knowledge that the conduct for which he was fired would likely
result in termination.
Finally, the conduct for which the claimant was fired must
have been in the claimant's control.
32.

Champlin,

744 P.2d at 331-

Here, as discussed above, the uncontroverted testimony was

that the presence of marijuana in Johnson's system was due to
factors totally outside his control. Johnson testified that if
there was marijuana in his system it must have been from his
passive inhalation of his roommates' daily marijuana use.
Hearing, pp. 12-13.

The other logical explanation for the

positive test was the residue of marijuana in his system from
previous use.

Certainly Johnson had no control over the speed at

which his body rid itself of the drug.
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Thus Johnson had no

control over the small amount of marijuana in his system which
caused the positive test and his termination from Morton Thiokol.
Johnson therefore lacked the culpability, knowledge and
control necessary for a rightful denial of unemployment
compensation.

The Board of Review did not follow the analysis

established by this Court, but instead ruled that any positive
test for marijuana is grounds for denial of unemployment
benefits, regardless of the claimant's culpability, knowledge and
control.

This ignores logic, rationality, fairness and the Board

of Review's obligation to act in accord with standards set by
established precedent.

This arbitrary Board of Review action

should be reversed.

C*

THE BOARD OF REVIEW VIOLATED STATE AND FEDERAL
GUARANTEES OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE IAWS

The Board of Review's decision violates state and federal
equal protection.

Article I, Section 2 4 of the Utah State

Constitution provides:
uniform operation."

"All laws of a general nature shall have

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution prohibits states from denying to "any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
These Constitutional guarantees may be violated both in enacting
statutes and rules, and in their execution by government
officials.

Arrinqton v. Mass. Bay Transit Authority, 306 F.Supp.

1355, 1353 (D.Mass. 1969).

Administrative bodies are subject to

the limitations of equal protection.

Hennessey v. Ind. School

Di^t.. 552 P.2d 1141, 1152 (Okl. 1976).
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Here, the Board of

Review's flawed application of an otherwise constitutionally
valid statute violated equal protection.
Equal protection requires a two part analysis.

First,

"classifications and the different treatment given the classes
must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to
further the objectives of the statute."
661 f 670 (Utah 1984);

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d

State Tax Commission v. Dept. of Finance,

576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978).

Under both state and federal law, a

"classification must rest upon some difference which bears a
reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the
classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and
without any such basis."

Malan, 693 P.2d at 672 quoting

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
Here, the Board of Review's decision has the effect of
creating a separate class of all employees fired for positive
drug tests whose drug use does not relate to work performance.
All other claimants will be reviewed under the culpability,
knowledge and control standard applied in Champlin.

Those, such

as Johnson, with positive drug tests will be denied compensation
merely on the result of the test, despite the many circumstances
which may give rise to a positive test, and despite the fact that
any drug use may have had no negative impact on the employer.
This simply has no rational and just relationship to the purpose
of the unemployment compensation statutes and rules.
The purpose of the Employment Security Act and the relative
departmental rules is to determine the eligibility of claimants,
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and to affect the distribution of benefits to those qualified.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-2.

Those claimants who are shown to have

been fired for just cause for job related misconduct will be
rightfully denied benefits, and those who were not fired for just
cause within the meaning of the statute will be allowed to
benefit from the ameliorative effects of unemployment
compensation.

The distinction drawn by the Board of Review bears

no rational relation to that purpose, so the class lines drawn by
the Board of Review decision are impermissibly narrow.
The only class which may be fashioned with a rational
relationship to the purposes of the Employment Security Act is
the class comprised of all employees, otherwise qualified, who
are challenged as having been terminated for just cause.

Having

thus defined the class, the applicable statutes and rules as they
have been interpreted may be applied to individual cases to
determine qualified applicants.

Johnson and others similarly

situated are members of that class, and must be treated in parity
with other class members.
Second,shaving defined the class, the law must be applied
equally to all class members. Maian, 693 P.2d at 670; State Tax
Commission, 576 P.2d at 1298.

Disparate treatment of class

members must be rationally related to the purpose of the statute.
Id*

"When persons are similarly situated, it is unconstitutional

to single out one person or group of persons from among a larger
class on the basis of a tenuous justification that has little or
no merit." Malan, 693 P.2d at 671; See Dodge Town Inc. v. Romney,
28

480 P.2d 461 (Utah 1961).
Here, all other members of the class are judged on a
standard which requires some conduct of the claimant which
injured the employer in its business, i.e., some job related
conduct.

To deny benefits to Johnson for conduct not related to

the job is an irrational distinction not related to the purpose
of the statute.

The purpose of the Employment Security Act is to

determine the qualification of claimants to receive unemployment
compensation and to distribute those benefits to qualified
claimants.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-2.

Unemployment compensation

is an ameliorative measure which should be liberally construed to
achieve its purpose.

Logan Hospital, 723 P.2d at 429.

Rather,

in its decision the Board of Review references the purposes of
the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, to create a drug free work
force and quality products.
pg. 3;

Board of Review Decision 88-BR-428,

See Utah Code Ann. § 34-38-1.

The Drug and Alcohol

Testing Act, however, was not passed to determine the
qualification of applicants for unemployment compensation, and is
not rationally related to that end.

We must assume the Drug and

Alcohol Testing Act will achieve its purpose without the
misplaced aid of the Industrial Commission Board of Review.

The

objectives and means of the Employment Security Act must guide
the Boards of Review in determining awards of unemployment
compensation.

To follow another purpose is arbitrary and

irrational and violates equal protection.
Johnson is similarly situated with all other applicants
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otherwise qualified to receive unemployment compensation.

If his

qualification is challenged, he must be reviewed under the same
standard applicable to all other members of his class, the
standard of fault applied in Champlin and other cases.

There is

no reason rationally related to the purpose of the Employment
Security Act which justifies the Board of Review's departure from
that true course.

D.

THE BOARD OF REVIEW DECISION VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS

Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution
provides:

"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or

property, without due process of law."

The Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution similarly imposes on states the
same obligation.

Stated simply, substantive due process protects

individuals from arbitrary action of state administrative
agencies.

Wilwording v. Swenson, 502 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1974)

(disciplinary action of the Missouri State Penitentiary).
Utah Supreme Court stated in relation to agency action:

The
"If the

act operates equally and affords freedom from arbitrary action it
satisfies the requirements of substantive due process.

Due

process may be characterized as a standard of reasonableness."
Mineer v. Board of Review,

572 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Utah 1977).

The

rights secured by substantive due process may be violated be
enacting a violative statute, or by flawed construction or
application of a statute valid on its face.
City, 120 F.2d 861, 865 (10th Cir. 1941);
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Qnev v. Oklahoma

See T.R.F. v. Falan.

760 P.2d 906, 914-15 (Utah App. 1988) (statutory scheme
constitutional but application by court violated due process).
Here, the Board of Review's arbitrary and unreasonable denial of
Johnson's unemployment compensation violates due process.
First, the effect of the Board of Review decision is to deny
benefits to one who has taken no affirmative act in derogation of
his right to benefits, Johnson's uncontroverted testimony was
that he tested positive as a result of passive inhalation of
others' marijuana smoke or as a result of residue.

The Board of

Review found that if passive inhalation were sufficient to
register a positive test it would be sufficient cause for a
denial of benefits.

Thus mere association with marijuana users

is sufficient grounds for denial of unemployment compensation.
That is arbitrary and unreasonable and a denial of due process.
Further, as discussed in relation to equal protection,
Johnson was denied unemployment compensation for conduct wholly
unrelated to his job performance.

Although such conduct may be

sufficient grounds for termination by a private employer, it is
not a sufficient basis to deny Johnson unemployment compensation.
To deny benefits to Johnson for conduct not related to his job
performance or the interest of the employer is arbitrary,
irrational and unrelated to the purpose of the Employment
Security Act.
Finally, the Board of Review singled out Johnson for a
denial of benefits in contradiction of established precedent.
Although a Morton Thiokol employee might understand that off the
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job marijuana use may subject him to loss of his job, Johnson
could not have known that such conduct would subject him to loss
of his unemployment benefits because the established law was
contrary.

If the Board had properly applied the three prong test

of Champlin it would have found in favor of Johnson and allowed
benefits.

The Board of Review's failure to properly apply

applicable law is arbitrary, unreasonable, and a violation of due
process.
The Board of Review's decision, therefore, is arbitrary and
unreasonable of its own logic.

It also has no rational relation

to the purpose of the Employment Security Act which it purports
to apply.

It therefore violates Johnson's rights protected by

substantive due process and must be overturned.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The Board of Review's decision to reverse the award of
benefits by the Administrative Law Judge should be overturned by
this Court and remanded to the Board of Review to reinstate the
prior award of unemployment compensation.

The Board's decision

is not based on substantial evidence, nor are its conclusions
rational or reasonable.

It blatantly disregards established

precedent of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court.

It violates

equal protection because its ruling applies to an impermissibly
narrow class, or because it singles out a group within an
appropriate class for grossly disparate treatment.

Finally, it

violates substantive due process because it applies the
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Employment Security Act in a manner with no reasonable relation
to that Act's purpose.

This Court, therefore, should overturn

the Board of Review's decision and order the Board of Review to
reinstate Claimant's award of unemployment compensation.

DATED this 15th day of March, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
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